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Abstract
The cost-effectiveness of the Kyoto Protocol and any similar non-global treaty  would be
enhanced by attracting as many new countries as possible to international emissions trading
and achieving these additions as soon as possible. This paper focuses on two forms of
compensation that can be used to attract poor, risk-averse countries to participate in emissions
trading. The theoretical as well as experimental evidence presented here suggests that, if poor
countries are more risk averse than rich countries, partial compensation in terms of financial
transfers is more cost-effective than relying solely on Assigned Amounts as has been the case
so far. In fact, the theoretical argument for cost-effectiveness indicates that large parts of the
Assigned Amounts to new participating countries should be replaced by financial transfers.
Using money for partial compensation would also reduce the risk for ’hot air’ allocations and
the ensuing political obstacles to cost-effectiveness that such allocations tend to create.
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Introduction
Cost-effectiveness is a crucial as well as a likely requirement for agreements on international
climate change policy, especially those aimed at substantial reductions in greenhouse gas
(GHG) emissions. This is also borne out in the wording of the Framework Convention of
Climate Change and, in particular, the Kyoto Protocol (KP); see UNFCCC (1992) and UN
(1997). Regardless of whether the KP will take effect as it stands or be renegotiated,
international emissions trading (IET) is likely to be a dominant instrument for cost-effective
reductions in aggregate emissions. The pioneering set of trader countries may be small, at
most 38 in the present version of the KP, which comprises mainly rich OECD countries and
economies in transition, the so-called Annex B countries.
1 Even though this set might cover
several of the major emitters and therefore a significant share of the global level of emissions,
low-cost abatement options in developing countries would not be available to help minimize
the costs of global emissions reductions, except to the extent made possible by the Clean
Development Mechanism (CDM) of the KP. The cost-saving capacity of this mechanism may
not be large, however. Monitoring problems and the resulting high transaction costs would
effectively exclude ’small emission abatement projects’ (concerning car use, heating, etc.)
that may well dominate the set of cost-effective abatement options.
2
Therefore, expanding IET by increasing the number of countries committed to stringent
emission quotas would, under fairly general conditions, improve the cost-effectiveness of the
climate policy, provided that the new countries’ Assigned Amounts (AAs) of GHG emissions
are not too large.
3 Both this group of countries and the group of pre-existing trader countries
                                                          
1 The countries that are allocated Assigned Amounts of GHG emissions and can participate in IET according to
the KP are listed in its Annex B.
2 The CDM allows a committed Annex B country to invest in abatement projects in non-Annex B countries and
be credited with (part of) the estimated emission reductions of such projects. A major concern here is that the
baseline, needed for estimating a CDM project’s contribution to emission reductions, is unobservable. This
becomes particularly troublesome since both the host and the investor countries – the two parties likely to have
the best information concerning the project and its interdependence with other relevant projects – have incentives
to exaggerate the estimates of the emission reductions achieved. It is sometimes argued that these problems can
be limited by the use of various kinds of benchmarks. Even if these hopes prove right, the transaction costs are
likely to be non-trivial. Since neither monitoring problems (for carbon emissions) nor transaction cost of the
same order of magnitude exist for IET and since IET comprises all abatement measures, not only those of large
projects, having non-Annex B countries committed to AAs and hence, having IET replacing CDM, would
enhance the cost-effectiveness of the climate change policy.
3 Adding more participants would not only make their low-cost abatement options available for emission
reductions, it would also tend to reduce the scope for ’carbon (or GHG) leakage’, i.e., reduce migration of GHG
emitting production to countries not committed to emission constraints. Furthermore, adding more participants in
IET is likely to affect ordinary trade and hence, the countries’ terms of trade. In what follows, we will abstract
from effects on GHG leakage and terms of trade.3
stand to gain from the increased cost-effectiveness of including additional countries in IET.
4 It
is important to note that if the set of participating countries is not expanded at the earliest
possible occasion, part of the gains in cost-effectiveness is lost forever. The reason is, of
course, that those low-cost emission reductions already feasible during a first conceivable
commitment period then cannot be used during that period.
Another potential cost-effectiveness reason why non-Annex B countries should join IET as
early as possible concerns the fear that, in the context of the present KP, dominant agents such
as the US as a buyer or Russia as a seller could try to distort trade to their advantage. For
example, Russia might use its market power to withhold supply, thereby increasing the prices
of assigned amount units (AAUs). If so, increasing the number of (large) traders would also
tend to reduce such risks. Furthermore, additional traders and larger transaction volumes
might make it more likely that an efficient AAU exchange would be introduced to replace a
system of bilateral trading where transaction costs are higher and market transparency lower
(Bohm, 1999).
5   
In the present version of the KP, the AAs of the individual signatories are such that the (ex
post IET) net costs of the aggregate emission reductions will be borne by the rich countries.
The AAs of the poorer signatories – so far only countries in transition to market economies  –
are large enough to almost ensure that these countries are at least fully compensated by AAU
sales. However, for the poorer members of this pioneering set of trader countries, the
uncertainty of net gains from this novel kind of trading may be particularly worrisome. This
may be a reason why the compensations required for their participation were set at a high
level. It is a common belief that, in the present version of the KP, economies in transition such
as Russia and Ukraine have been allotted surplus units or so-called hot air, i.e., AAs that
exceed, perhaps by far, their prospective business-as-usual (BAU) emissions level. If so,
emissions trading might well more than compensate them.
6
                                                          
4 For an illustration of a case where the pre-existing ’signatories’ of an emission-reducing IET treaty were taken
to comprise only countries in Western Europe and where an increased cost-effectiveness of such a treaty were
attained by the participation of fully compensated countries in Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union, see
Bohm and Larsen, 1994.
5 It should be noted that if AAUs are traded on an exchange (a double auction), buyer or seller withholding is
unlikely to be used in final trading and if so, market power would not lead to market inefficiency (Carlén, 1999).
This, however, may not address the conventional wisdom or the concern as perceived by potential trader
countries that the market power problem can be kept at bay only by increasing the number of traders.
6 Article 17 of the KP allows for an introduction of binding constraints on IET, the effect of which would be to
reduce the cost-effectiveness of the agreement. The EU and some non-Annex B countries wish to specify the
contents of Article 17 of the Protocol so as to remove the expected ‘over-compensations’  by imposing
constraints on the sales by economies in transition and on the purchases by other countries. This is so in spite of
the fact that such ‘hot air’ allocations were accepted by all Parties to the Protocol and may have been the best
deal the Parties could have reached in Kyoto, i.e., that the Parties concerned would not have accepted any lower,
no ’hot-air’ AAs (Bohm, 1999, Baumert et al., 1999, p.7).4
The gain in cost-effectiveness from adding countries to the treaty could be used either to
achieve the aggregated emission reduction of the KP at a lower cost or to increase the overall
emission reduction, given the aggregate compliance cost of the original KP, or some
combination thereof. However, new participants can be expected to be unwilling to accept an
agreement that is certain to let pre-existing (rich) signatories get away with a reduction in
their commitment costs. Moreover, given that the emission reductions of the KP are generally
taken as only a first step, there is little risk of overshooting the relevant climate policy target.
Hence, a perhaps more likely target for a cost-effective policy agreement would be one that
maximizes aggregate emission reductions given that (a) total costs, all borne by the pre-
existing signatories, were kept at the level implied by the KP, and (b) the additional countries
are allotted AAs that keep them fully, but barely, compensated.
Compensation to new participants in IET is typically taken to be made in terms of
sufficiently large AAs, as was the case for the economies in transition in the KP. In this paper,
we ask whether this is indeed the most cost-effective method. More specifically, we address
the question of whether this is true for poor, risk-averse, potential new participants in IET.
The paper is divided into two parts; the first concerned with theory and the second with an
experiment to test the propositions derived from theory. The reason for complementing the
theoretical analysis with an experimental evaluation is twofold. First, results from
Experimental Economics have indicated that experimental data do not always support even
well-established theoretical predictions. This is particularly true for theories of decision
making under uncertainty based on the expected utility hypothesis, possibly relevant in the
present context. Second, with respect to issues related to the choice of policy design (as here),
policy makers may not be very impressed by results from theory alone. Then, in the absence
of empirical data (as here), experimental data that lend support to theoretical results – to the
extent they turn out to do so – would make the case clearer.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 provides an analytical point of departure by
showing how a maximum of participants would produce a cost-effective win/win option in a
case of perfect information. In Section 2, we identify compensation options for attracting poor
countries as participants in IET under uncertainty (2.1) and compare compensation for risk
taking in terms of extra AAs with compensation in terms of financial transfers (2.2-3). This
comparison was subjected to an experimental test reported in Section 3. Some discussion and
qualifications are offered in Section 4 and our main conclusions are summarized in Section 5.
1. The certainty case
To begin with, we assume that there are no binding political barriers or lack of information
which, alone, would prevent a country from engaging in negotiations that might lead to an5
expanded IET treaty at the earliest possible date. Traders can be either governments and/or
firms (legal entities), to whom IET has been devolved by governments that have allocated, in
one way or another, their AAs as permits to firms. Furthermore, we assume that all IET is
carried out on a perfectly competitive market. Moreover, to simplify the discussion we
assume insignificant income effects and zero transaction costs. Given this, changes in net
profits as a result of the opening up of IET would not alter the countries’ demand for
commodities whose production would generate carbon/GHG emissions and hence, leave their
marginal-abatement-cost (MAC) functions unchanged. This means that, for a given sum of
AAs, the efficient abatement distribution between countries (the point where their MACs are
equal) remains the same regardless of how the sum of AAs initially was allocated among the
countries (cf. Montgomery, 1972).
In this section, we show how a fully cost-effective and Pareto superior version of a non-
global IET treaty could be designed under certainty, when an additional country or group of
countries, called ’country’ AC, joins a set of industrial countries already committed to AAs
and IET, called ’country’ IC. In the case of perfect foresight, where all marginal abatement
costs are assumed to be commonly known, the minimum AA required by AC for participating
in IET is such that the value of profit maximizing sales of AAUs equals AC’s abatement costs
(plus some minimum incentive amount, of course, henceforth not explicitly paid attention
to).
7 This situation is illustrated in Figure 1, where
i) IC (AC) emissions are counted from the left (right) axis to the right (left) and the width of
the open box represents the aggregate AAs of the two Parties
ii) Qi is country i’s emissions under BAU, i.e., the country's emissions level in the absence of
a climate treaty (i = AC, IC)
iii) MACi shows country i’s marginal abatement costs, and
iv) Q’IC is the emissions level to which IC is initially committed and at which its MAC equals
p1
e (= the equilibrium price for emissions trading solely among the set of countries
constituting IC).
Abatement by AC would set out from AC’s BAU emissions level, QAC in Figure 1, and
move to the right at costs shown by MACAC. Had AC received an AA equal to QAC, its
efficient emission reductions up to some AAU price and hence, its export revenue, would
have exceeded its abatement costs. To keep AC barely compensated, AC need not have an
AA larger than Q’AC, defined so as to have its abatement export revenues (IC's import
                                                          
7 If future AA allocations were expected to be positively related to the size of first-period AAs, an additional
reason would emerge for countries to push for first-period AAs being as high as possible. In the following
discussion we abstract from this aspect and presume that minimum compensations demanded are based solely on
the estimated consequences of IET for the period in question.6
expenditures), p2
h(Q’AC – Q2
h), equal to the costs of reducing its emissions from QAC to Q2
h. In
this situation, shown in the Figure, the resulting trade gains would be shared by the two
countries as indicated by GIC and GAC.
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What is shown in Figure 1 can be seen as a hypothetical first step towards an AA
allocation, where the aggregate emissions level is minimized, given that IC's costs (ex post
IET) equal those of the pre-existing climate treaty and AC is held fully compensated. Then, in
a hypothetical second step, the formerly agreed Q’IC must be reduced to a quantity that
eliminates IC’s profits in terms of GDP, thus reducing the width of the open box and shifting
the MACAC curve to the left. This has to take into account that the AAU price now goes up,
which makes AC’s profits increase at Q’AC. Then, in a third step, to keep AC barely
compensated, its AA has to be reduced, which further increases the AAU price, and in turn
calls for an increase in IC’s AA, etc. up to the AA allocation, where IC and AC are barely
compensated at an equilibrium price equal to p2
e (see Figure 2). At this allocation, (i) AC’s
zero-gain AA equals QAC’’ (< QAC’ since p2
e > p2
h) and (ii) IC’s gain from the reduced
equilibrium AAU price (from p1
e to
 p2
e) is neutralized by IC accepting an AA equal to QIC’’
                                                          
8 Although, in the absence of a climate treaty, some countries may want to reduce emissions on their own –
especially relevant, perhaps, for large countries – this is not explicitly observed in Figures 1 and 2.7
(which contributes to the leftward shift of MACAC by a’ in this Figure), see the two shaded
areas. See Appendix A 1.1 for a formal derivation of these results. 
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2. Compensation for uncertain trade gains: theory
2.1 Compensation options
Introducing uncertainty concerning MACs and hence, concerning AAU prices, exposes the
Parties in an IET agreement to risk taking. A basic assumption here is that AC is risk averse
                                                          
9 By presuming common knowledge about the Parties’ MACs, this case may not be too far from a conceivable
real-world case. Few countries can be expected to accept joining IET without doing their best to estimate their
own MACs as well as the expected market price for emissions trading. To compute this price for a first
commitment period, a country would essentially have to try to estimate the other countries’ MACs and hence the
aggregate net excess supply or demand confronting it. Each additional country would also need to evaluate the
implications of proposed AA allocations between itself and other countries. This establishes a clear motive for
all potentially additional countries to estimate the other countries’ MACs. As a result of national efforts as well
as those of international organizations, estimated MACs of most of the countries involved can thus be assumed
to be common knowledge among all countries considering whether to participate in an enlarged IET treaty for an
upcoming commitment period.8
and significantly more so than IC. To simplify, we assume that IC is risk neutral and AC risk
averse.
 10
The discussion in this section and in Section 3 addresses the issue of a cost-effective design
of compensating AC for its risk aversion and specifically whether the traditionally assumed
form of compensation, i.e., in terms of AAs only, is indeed a cost-effective option also in the
case of risk or uncertainty (the two terms used interchangeably in what follows). The AAU
price uncertainty confronting AC would be reduced if IC offered AC a price stabilization
scheme, e.g., an AAU price floor. This is akin to measures that have occasionally been used to
reduce income risks due to price fluctuations on primary commodities (see Newbery and
Stiglitz, 1981). An even more ambitious option would be to eliminate price uncertainty
altogether for AC by establishing a long-term contract according to which IC buys whatever
is offered by AC at an agreed price. (A different design of such contracts is discussed in
Section 4.1.)
Another approach to compensating for uncertainty is suggested in Philibert (1999), where
an IET treaty is designed so as to reduce the effect of uncertainty for developing countries to a
worst case outcome of zero gains. This design amounts to giving developing countries the
option of either (i) engaging in IET, if they expect to gain from AAU sales, then being
committed to the AAs they have conditionally accepted, or (ii) simply abstaining from
participating in IET and then no longer being committed to their AAs. A version of this
approach is discussed below.
11
Here, we focus on financial transfers as a form of compensation for risk aversion that can
be fairly easily compared to the ’traditional’ one. To begin with, the latter option will be
described as giving AC an additional amount X of AAUs on top of a basic AA allocations
sufficient for a risk-neutral country, i.e., an AA that would make its expected net gains of
joining the treaty equal to zero. The former option amounts to replacing X by a financial
transfer (M).
12 We assume that AC obtains trade revenues as well as any financial transfer at
                                                          
10 The fact that poor people may be taken to be more risk averse than rich people does not necessarily carry over
to governments of poor and rich countries. For example, if governments are dictatorial or under some kind of
extreme pressure, their behavior may be characterized by strong preferences for risk taking. Still, the discussion
here will be based on the assumption that governments of poor countries are typically and significantly more risk
averse than those of rich countries.
11 Still another way of reducing the uncertainty that confronts AC would be to set the assignment for a growing
AC in terms of a maximum carbon (or GHG) intensity for the country’s GDP (or even individual sector activity
levels) instead of a fixed AA, see Baumert et al., 1999. In this way the AA would be endogenized to reflect the
uncertainty of the future GDP (or sector activity levels). However, AC would still face uncertainty regarding its
own MAC and the AAU price.
12 This is an option that does not seem to have been discussed in the literature on IET. By contrast, financial
transfers have been the obvious and only instrument considered for compensating poor countries when
international carbon taxes or harmonized domestic carbon taxes are discussed.9
the same point in time, say, at the end of the commitment period, i.e., when AC is found to be
in compliance with its AA and seller commitments.
13
Increasing the distance between the date at which an IET agreement is ratified and that at
which the agreement enters into operation raises the participating countries’ ability to form
real capital in accordance with expected future trading prices. However, there are benefits also
from allowing Parties to ratify or leave such agreements at a stage near the start of the
commitment period when more is known about the implications of a particular commitment.
Improved information of this kind may be particularly valuable for a poor country and may
call for a treaty design where AC is allowed to confirm an early, preliminary agreement at a
late date. Therefore, we will compare the X and M options also for a treaty design of this type.
Observing an alternative to compensating AC by increasing its AA has an additional
interest in that it could provide a significant potential benefit in terms of reducing the risk for
the appearance of a ’hot air’ allocation. As noted above, the possibility of allocations
containing ’hot air’ has spurred some Parties to demand reductions of  trade in ’hot air’ by
introducing constraints on emissions trading (see footnote 6). Such constraints, if binding,
would reduce the efficiency of IET. Hence, if compensation for risk aversion were carried out
in M instead of X, the risk for ’hot air’ allocations and the introduction of such constraints
would be smaller.
2.2 Comparing compensation options
Introducing uncertainty and AC risk aversion, the targeted outcome of minimum aggregate
reservation emissions (as illustrated in Figs. 1 and 2) is transformed into one of a minimum
compensation (in X or M) to AC and a minimum AA for M = 0, or minimum expected AA
value minus M > 0, for IC so that both Parties once again are indifferent (to their GDPs status
quo ante). A financial transfer M would have to come explicitly from IC. Given an AC
reservation M’ > 0, IC would not accept an AA as small as that when M = 0. Other things
equal, its AA would then have to be increased by an amount X’, the expected value of which
equals M’. Since AC is risk averse, simple theory suggests that AC would prefer the certain
amount M’ to the uncertain X’. If so, a larger aggregate emission reduction can be attained
under M' than under X'.
                                                          
13 This is a design of seller liability that has been discussed in the literature. It requires, if need be, that AC
finances costly abatement measures by loans, e.g., from organizations like the World Bank, possibly using AAU
exports made or agreed financial transfers as collateral. It also requires, of course, that IC cannot decide
unilaterally whether to pay or not. For example, IC would have to credit an account, kept in escrow until AC is
found in compliance, (a) for its AAU imports when trade occurs and (b) the agreed (discounted) M before the
start of the commitment period.10
  A number of uncertain factors, such as future economic activities, technologies and
exogenous factors influencing fossil fuel prices, are likely to affect the slope and location of
the MAC curves of the countries participating in IET and hence, contribute to making their
net gains from participating uncertain. The reasons for the uncertainty is not important here,
but, to fix ideas, we view uncertainty as if it were determined by an uncertain exogenously
determined oil price which affects only the location, but not the slope, of the MAC curves. In
effect, we assume that the uncertainty involved is expressed as a commonly known (normal)
probability distribution of the resulting equilibrium AAU price when AC participates in IET.
The AA allocation that would make AC’s and IC’s expected net gains equal to zero is shown
in Appendix A 1.2. This basic allocation would be the solution to the problem of minimizing
aggregate emissions while keeping both countries barely compensated, given that they were
both risk neutral. Introducing risk aversion for AC, AC would need an AA increased by X or
a financial transfer, M, to be fully compensated. This would influence AAU prices and
reservation asks, eventually revealing an outcome, where both AC and IC are barely fully
compensated in the sense defined above. This is illustrated in Appendix A1.3 for a numerical
example, which is also the test bed to be used in the experiment.
The objective of the test to be reported is to see whether or not the proposition that a risk-
averse AC prefers M to X, given their cost to IC, is supported by the behavior of subjects
placed in a position similar to that of AC. The test also includes the above-mentioned treaty
design where an agreement on X or M would be preliminary only and would allow AC to
reject – at some small but non-trivial penalty as compensation to IC – or finally accept the
agreement at a later point in time close to the beginning of the commitment period. Given the
character of this treaty design, the minimum AC asks (maximum IC offers) are likely to be at
most as high as in the case of the X and M commitments that were mutually binding right
from the start; this is so at least if the latter case were equally uncertain. The hypothesis about




The experiment is aimed at testing the hypothesis that a financial transfer is more cost-
effective than a transfer of AAUs in compensating a risk-averse AC for the uncertainty
associated with participating in climate treaties of the kind discussed above. Although the
real-world level of such compensations would be determined in negotiations between AC and
IC, the experiment does not intend to mimic any form of negotiations between the Parties.11
The principal reason is that the generality of the results of such negotiation experiments can
be expected to be low. Instead, the route taken here is to create an experimental situation for
investigating AC's minimum demands; such demands that are needed in order to ascertain the
feasibility as well as the cost-effectiveness of alternative forms of agreements can hardly be
observed outside the laboratory. Here, minimum compensation demands are elicited for each
type of compensation by giving subjects representing AC incentives to reveal their true
minimum compensation levels. As explained below, such incentives were established by
letting subjects state their asks for compensation under the so-called Becker-deGroot-
Marschak (BDM) mechanism, known to provide incentives for truthful revelation.
As mentioned in the Introduction, experimental testing of theoretical propositions
concerning the design of new policies may be needed, in particular when policy makers can
be expected to remain unconvinced by theoretical arguments alone. Moreover, for such
purposes, a case can be made for using an experimental design that would perform well
pedagogically for policy makers. The methodological ambition of the experiment conducted
here is to identify and use a context-explicit design for studying the new policy field of IET.
14
The experiment was designed so that (in particular, lay readers of the results could believe
that) the subjects were exposed to a real-world-like context and to incentives similar to those
that would exist in the real world. The premise is that the noise produced by a ‘non-context’
that has little meaning for the intended real-world application may confuse the subjects’
notion of the purpose of the study and hence distort their responses or that critical readers may
believe that to be the case.
15
The experiment consists of two pairs of tests. In the first (M-X), asks are elicited for
compensation in money (M) and, alternatively, in AAUs (X) for a case where it is assumed
that there exist objective probabilities of different states of the world. In the second test (M
prel-
X
prel), subjects ask for compensation in a situation where they only have access to estimates of
the likelihood of different states of the world, but have the option to withdraw from the
negotiated treaty at a later stage when better information would be available.
                                                          
14 In earlier tests, attempts have been made (a) to find appropriate experimental designs for evaluating the cost-
effectiveness of government trading among a small set of similar countries, using real government-appointed
traders and incentives other than money (Bohm, 1997a; Bohm and Carlén, 1999), and (b) to identify a subject
type and appropriate incentives likely to deliver some insights into the pre-Kyoto attitudes of developed as well
as developing countries with respect to joining an IET protocol (Bohm, 1997b).
15 The common procedure in Experimental Economics is to use abstract or synthetic, i.e., not context-related,
experimental designs. This is also based on an ambition to avoid noise, although of another kind: subjects’
attitudes towards context-specific ingredients (such as global warming, government intervention, etc.) could risk
making subjects respond in accordance with idiosyncratic valuations irrelevant for the purpose of the study. Our
choice of design reflects the judgment that this particular risk, and its possible tendency to bias the responses, is
considered to be less troublesome in this case.  For a further discussion of context-specific experiments, see e.g.,
Loewenstein, 1999.12
The test bed used here is based on the allocation of AAs proposed in the Kyoto Protocol
for the Annex B countries and on available estimates of these countries’ BAU emissions
levels and marginal abatement costs, see Appendix A2. To fix ideas, it is assumed that all
Annex B countries have ratified the Kyoto Protocol and that, some time prior to the first
commitment period (2008-12), these countries would invite a large developing country AC
(India) to a renegotiated climate treaty. In line with the theoretical discussion in the preceding
section, the test bed is based on the assumptions that
i)  the Annex B countries act as a single decision maker, IC (i.e., coalitional problems are
disregarded),
ii)  the market for AAUs is competitive,
iii)  the basic AAs in the proposed climate treaty are such that AC’s expected net costs equal
zero and the IC’s expected net costs equal those under the initial climate treaty (the Kyoto
Protocol)
16.
As mentioned above, the uncertainty surrounding (future) marginal abatement costs and,
hence, AAU prices are taken to stem from uncertain future oil prices only. In the experiment,
the oil price could take any of three equally likely values. This means that for each
compensation level AC’s net gains could take any of three equally likely values. For details
about the test bed, see Appendix A1.3.
Experimental context and subject tasks
To avoid having the subject confused about why this test was carried out and specifically why
(s)he was placed in the context of reporting his/her minimum compensation levels for
participating in, what amounts to, two types of lotteries, the subject was encouraged to regard
him/herself as placed in the role of a consultant to the government of a developing country in
the situation now explained. Thus, the subjects could either consider what compensation level
they would suggest the developing country would ask for with respect to each of the four
different compensation mechanisms or disregard this context and simply consider their own
willingness to accept to participate in different types of risk taking. With an ambition to use
subjects with an educational and intellectual background similar to that of persons who in
their future professional life may well be consultants to the government of a developing
country, subjects were recruited from a pool of people trained in Economics, at least as
graduate students. Each subject was told that (s)he would receive a known fraction ($0.02 per
                                                          
16 This formulation is strictly correct only for the M-X case. In the case of M
prel-X
prel, when only estimates of the
likelihood of different states of the world exist, the term "expected" should be read "expected estimated". Having
said this, we will use the term "expected" for both cases.13
million) of the gains made by the country he/she represented.
17 To prevent that the subjects'
behavior would be influenced by knowledge about what country they represented (played
against) they were only told that the test bed was based on estimates of the conditions for real,
but unspecified, countries. (See the instructions in Appendix B.)
The distributions of the subject’s gains for different compensation levels for the M and X
tests are stated in Tables M and X, respectively (see Appendix B). In both Tables, the first
columns show the compensation levels the subjects could choose among. The Tables are
constructed so that for each compensation level (represented by a row in the Tables) the
subject’s expected total gains are equal for the two compensation forms, hence implying the
same costs to IC. However, since the value of AAUs is uncertain in contrast to the value of
money, the variance of the subjects’ gains for each compensation level is larger under X than
under M. In the M and X tests, the compensation level was limited from above by the level
where the AC’s gains would be non-negative in all states of the world, i.e., the level at which
the country and, hence, also the subject would be certain to gain. Since the spread of the net
gains is larger under the X mechanism than under the M mechanism, the choice set covered
23 compensation levels in test M and 26 in test X.
In the M
prel and X
prel tests, where the subjects had the opportunity to withdraw from the
treaty at a later point in time, Tables M and X , respectively, give the expected probability
distributions at the date of the first decision concerning the minimum compensation for
joining  the treaty. Since IC would not value a preliminary contract as highly as an
unconditional one, the subjects were told that the highest compensation levels they could ask
for in the M
prel and X
prel tests were lower than in the M-X tests, but not by how much. In M
prel
and X
prel tests the three highest compensation levels were omitted from each of the choice
sets.
In each round subjects could lose as well as win significant amounts of money, from
-$32 to $69 ($65) in the M (M
prel) rounds and from -$32 to $77 ($73) in the X (X
prel) rounds.
Each subject participated in all four rounds. Since the subjects should not be allowed to leave
the experiment with less than the show-up fee ($10), the aggregate maximum loss a subject
could make was limited in the following way. At the beginning of the experiment, the subjects
were given an initial payment of $20 each from which any aggregate net loss would be
deducted. If losses exceed $20, the overshooting amount would be remitted. Hence, a
                                                          
17 Thus, the incentive schedule induced in the experiment presupposes that the consultant’s payoff would be
positively related to AC’s actual gains. Although a real-world contract between a government and a consultant
may not explicitly state such incentives, the consultant’s career opportunities (or his/her firm’s future success)
would likely be believed to be positively related to the (gradual materialization of the) outcome for the country.14
subject’s actual loss or gain foregone would depend on the outcome in all rounds.
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The BDM mechanism was used to provide subjects with incentives to state their true
reservation asks. In each test, the procedure was as follows. First, each subject chose a
compensation level in Table M (X). Then a buyout compensation level was drawn from a
known distribution assigning equal probabilities to each of the compensation levels in Table
M (X) (minus the three bottom rows in the M
prel and X
prel tests). Subjects with asks lower or
equal to the buyout level drawn were qualified to sign the treaty and to (implicitly) engage in
IET, with a compensation level equal to the buyout level drawn; thus, they were entitled
to/bound by the outcomes in the three cells of the buyout level drawn. Subjects with asks
exceeding the buyout level drawn, would not be qualified to participate and hence, would not
make any gains or losses at all. By deviating from his/her true minimum compensation ask,
the subject would run the risk of not being fully compensated or of not benefiting from some
of the cases where they would be more than compensated.
In total, 32 subjects participated in the experiment: 29 graduate students and three Ph.D’s
in Economics. Subjects were randomly divided into two groups, A with 15 (there were two
no-shows in this group) and B with 17 participants. The two groups participated in the
experiment at a thirty-minute interval. Participation in the experiment took about 90 minutes.
Disregarding the availability of qualified subjects and the level of experimental costs, we
would have preferred to use a sufficiently large representative sample of such subjects for
each of the four options, instead of using the available 32 subjects to elicit reservation asks for
all four options. This creates a risk that the stated asks would not be independent of one
another. In particular, the order in which the mechanisms were presented to the subjects might
play a role, although we have no theory why that would be the case. To detect any such
effects, the two groups faced the mechanisms in each pair in different order, M-X and X
prel-
M
prel for Group A and X-M and M
prel-X
prel for Group B. Since the ”prel” versions were to
such a large extent based on an understanding of the one-decision-level versions, the order in
which the two pairs were tested was not reversed.
The procedural order
One day in advance of the experiment, the subjects were given extensive written instructions,
which they were asked to read carefully (to save time the next day) and vital parts of which
                                                          
18 This means that the subjects participated in lotteries somewhat less uncertain and with somewhat higher
expected values than as explicitly presented to them. Eliminating this effect would have been quite costly in that
each subject would have to be given an initial payment of $32 per round. Given a limited experiment budget and
the fact that (a) the subjects’ expected net gains in each round were positive (for all compensation levels) and (b)
as explained below, the subjects had to state their compensation asks for all four mechanisms before knowing
their earnings in any of the tests, an initial payment of $20 was deemed high enough to create a situation where
the subjects in each round also would take account of  the worst outcome.15
were repeated orally at the beginning of the experiment. This set of written instructions (see
Appendix B) contained
i)  an introduction to the climate change problem and the Kyoto Protocol as well as an
explanation for why a climate treaty comprising more countries would be more cost-
effective than one with fewer countries,
ii)  a description of the decision problem facing a developing country that is invited to a
climate treaty allowing international emissions trading, in particular the compensation
issue,
iii)  an explanation of the BDM mechanism to be used and the incentives it gives for truthful
revelation of minimum compensation asks,
iv)  presentation of the four compensation mechanisms and Tables M and X showing the
distribution of the subjects’ gains for various compensation levels for the M and X




v)  a suggestion that the subjects should contemplate already in advance their reservation
asks under the four mechanisms.
During the experiment the subjects received another set of written instructions for each test
in which they were asked to state their minimum compensation requirements.
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An individual’s attitude towards risk may be influenced by the outcome of a recent
exposure to risk. Therefore, the subjects had to state their asks for all four tests before the
buyout compensation levels and the states of the world were drawn for any of the four
mechanisms. Moreover, before handing over their responses to the conductor of the
experiment (not one of the authors), the subjects were given five minutes to check the internal
consistency of their responses.
After the responses had been collected, the subjects received the updated information for
the M
prel and X
prel tests (see Tables M
prel and X
prel). This information stated the real
probabilities assumed for the three different states of the world. The implications of this new
set of probabilities were such that, for each compensation level, the variance as well as the
expectations of the subjects’ net gains were significantly smaller than those of the original,
estimated probability distribution. Given this new information, subjects were asked to decide
whether they wanted to withdraw from any or both of the X
prel-M
prel options at a cost of $5 per
withdrawal, in case it would turn out that they were qualified to sign the treaty and thereby to
receive a compensation at least equal to their stated minimum level. This procedural order
was motivated by the use of the BDM mechanism. Had the subjects known the actual buyout
                                                          
19 These instructions, which relate to each specific ask and include the response forms used, can be obtained
from the authors upon request.16
compensation level before deciding whether or not to withdraw, their decisions would not
have been based upon their minimum compensation requirement, as is the relevant basis for
the decisions under study here. Instead, the subjects’ decisions would then be based on the
buyout levels drawn, which for those qualified could be (possibly substantially) higher than
their stated minimum compensation asks.
Finally, a buyout compensation level and a state of the world were randomly drawn for
each of the four tests in a fashion that the subjects could witness. As it turned out, the
outcomes (buyout level drawn, state of the world; net gain) in Group A were (2, Low;-$30)
for M, (17, Medium; $22) for X, (15, Medium; $19) for X
prel and (1, Low; -$32) for M
prel. In
group B, the outcomes were (14, Medium; $18) for X, (21, Low; -$3) for M, (14, Medium;
$18) for M
prel, and (14, Low; -$15) for X
prel. Net of the show-up fee of $10, but including the
initial payment of $20, the subjects’ total gains came to range from 0 to $61. (Had other




The choices made by the subjects in Groups A and B are illustrated in Figures 3 and 4,
respectively. As mentioned above, Tables M and X were constructed so that a subject’s
expected net gains under M and X were equal for a given compensation level, as given by the
same row in the two tables. Henceforth, when a compensation level number is referred to, it is
given by the million tons column in Table X, 1, 2, … etc.
In both groups, a majority stated asks which far exceeded the lowest level.
20 In Group A,
11 out of 14 and in Group B 15 out of 16 stated asks above the lowest level. Since the lowest
level is what a risk-neutral subject would choose, we interpret this to mean that a significant
fraction of the subjects, 25 out of 30, behaved as if they were risk averse. Moreover, in both
groups, a high (low) first ask – M for Group A and X for Group B – was followed by a high
(low) ask for X and M, respectively. However, the mean asks of Group B were clearly higher
than those of Group A. This implies that the order in which the mechanisms were presented
influenced the level of the asks, in spite of the fact that the subjects were given time to check
the internal consistency of their responses before handing them in. Explanations as to why
presenting X first led to higher mean asks elude us. But, the importance of testing for a
‘starting-point bias’ is noteworthy, even without a prior theory as to why the order of
presentation order might affect the outcome.
                                                          
20 Subjects A15 and B17 behaved in a clearly inconsistent manner in that they revealed risk aversion in one
decision pair but risk loving in another. They are therefore omitted from the analysis, with exception for the
significance tests below which are reported both with and without these two outliers.17
Given that, ideally, independent estimates of the four different asks should have been
elicited from four representative subject groups, the observed effects of the order of
presentation are an artefact of the experimental design used here. Since the need to elicit all
four asks from all subjects was determined by subject availability, a check for possible order
effects was required. Given that order effects, which have no meaning for the objective of the
test, indeed were observed, the best estimate of the relative performance of the M and X
mechanisms would seem to be obtained from the pooled data for the two groups. Despite this,
we have chosen to report data both pooled and group-wise.
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*The compensation level number is given by the million tons in Table X18
Although the difference in variance between the outcomes for M and X was modest, a total
of 15 of the 30 subjects differentiated their asks for the two mechanisms. All did so in the
direction expected for risk-averse decision makers, i.e., with a lower ask under the M
mechanism than under the X mechanism. The share of the subjects doing so was higher in
Group B than in Group A, 11 out of 16 as compared to 4 out of 14.
To properly evaluate the frequency of differentiated asks, it should be noted that the
subjects faced a discrete choice set (the rows in Tables M and X). This may have prevented
some subjects with low or modest degrees of risk aversion from differentiating their asks.
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Thus, it can only be expected that the relative frequency of differentiated asks is higher for
subjects with high asks than for subjects with lower asks. Figure 5 shows the relative
frequency of differentiated asks for different levels of risk aversion as revealed by the
subjects’ first choice, i.e., the level of M for Group A and X for Group B. A subject’s risk
aversion is said to be Low (including zero) if the subject’s first choice of compensation level
was between levels 1-4, Medium if in the interval 5-9 and High if at least equal to level 10.
Note that no subjects who revealed Low risk aversion in their first choice differentiated their
asks between M and X, while 10 of the 11 subjects classified as having High risk aversion did
so.
                                                          
21 Given a continuous choice set, a decision maker for whom the mean-variance approach with constant absolute
risk aversion is applicable could find it worthwhile to state a lower ask under M than under X, no matter how
small his/her risk aversion was. Since the decision maker here has to choose one of the compensation levels
stated in Tables M and X, respectively, (s)he might not find it worthwhile to state differentiated asks. Assuming
that the BDM mechanism was successful in eliciting the subjects reservation asks, it can be shown that Tables M
and X indicate that this decision maker could find it worthwhile to differentiate his/her asks only if having a risk
aversion high enough to call for a compensation level exceeding level 8.
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The hypothesis of equal asks under the two mechanisms is rejected in favor of the
hypothesis of lower compensation asks under M than under X. P-values are 6.2% for Group A
and less than 1% for Group B and the pooled data.
22 Thus, if governments of developing
countries are risk averse and would make decisions in the same way as risk-averse subjects
did in this experiment, the conclusion is that a monetary transfer is more cost-effective than a
transfer of additional AAUs in compensating developing countries for uncertain net gains
from joining a climate treaty that allows IET. As mentioned above, the experimental design
(especially its discrete choice set) may have induced subjects with low or modest degrees of
risk aversion to avoid differentiating their compensation demands between the cases where
compensation is given in money and additional AAUs, respectively. Thus, it is tempting to





In the first two decision rounds, subjects were asked to choose compensation levels with
known probabilities of the different outcomes. In the M
prel and X
prel decision rounds subjects
had to choose compensation levels, given only estimates of the likelihood of the different
outcomes, but with an option to annul the contract at a given, fairly small, cost when, at a later
point in time, new information would be available.
The asks stated for M
prel and X
prel are shown in Figures 6 and 7, where subjects are ranked
by their first choice, M for Group A and X for Group B. An asterisk denotes that the subject
chose to withdraw from the contract after having received the updated information. The
picture roughly resembles that of the M and X rounds in that subjects who stated relatively
low (high) compensation asks there tended to do so also in the M
prel and X
prel rounds, although
in a much less pronounced fashion. It should be noted that, although the subjects knew less
under the M
prel and X
prel cases, the mean ask is now lower than in the M and X cases. Thus,
not surprisingly, it looks as if the option to annul the contract when new information becomes
available reduces the compensation required by risk-averse decision makers for entering a
climate treaty of the kind investigated.
                                                          
22 The Wilcoxon Signed Ranks test was used here. Including the outliers, we cannot reject the hypothesis of
equal asks for Group A while the p-values for Group B and the pooled data still are lower than 1%.20
Figure 8 shows the relative frequency of differentiated asks classified by the subjects’ first
choice in the previous two decision rounds. The frequency of differentiated asks is low, only
two in Group A and five in Group B. Taking into account the relatively modest annulment fee
($5 as compared to a maximum loss around $25 for subjects asking for compensation levels 1
- 10) and the fact that the subjects had no given probabilities to base any differentiation on, it
is possible that some subjects did not find it worthwhile to contemplate differentiating their
asks. The seven subjects who differentiated their asks did so in the direction predicted.
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As can be seen from Figures 6 and 7, the withdrawal pattern is irregular and seemingly
unrelated to the revealed degree of risk aversion. Recall that compensation levels
preliminarily accepted at the first decision point were not renegotiable at the second point,
where the expected outcome – as happened here – had deteriorated. Thus, subjects would
have to consider what was in store for them next: the expected mean and variance of  the
gains distribution implied by the BDM mechanism and the unknown cut-off level (see Tables
M
prel  and X
prel). Given this implication of using the BDM mechanism and given the lack of
any interesting systematic tendency in the withdrawal data, the existence of the second
decision – whether or not to withdraw – was unimportant here except for its impact on the
first decision – minimum compensation asks for cases where uncertainty is more pronounced
and where subsequent withdrawal from the treaty is possible.
The hypothesis of equal compensation asks is rejected in favor of the asks being higher
under X
prel than under M
prel only for Group B and the pooled data. P-values are 12.5% for
Group A, 3.1% for Group B and less than 1% for the pooled data.
23 However, as argued
above, the relevant observations are provided by the pooled data. Thus, the conclusion is that
also in cases where the developing country has to base its decision on estimates of the
probabilities of different outcomes, but where the developing country has the option to annul
the contract when new information becomes available, compensation in money is more cost-
effective than compensation in additional quota units.
                                                          
23 The Wilcoxon Signed Ranks test was used. Including the outliers, p-values were 7.8% for Group B and 2.7%
for pooled data.
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4. Discussion and qualifications
4.1. On the extent of replacing AA allocations by financial transfers
Given that cost-effective compensations for the risk aversion of new entrants into IET should
be made in terms of M instead of X, the question arises whether it is in fact cost-effective to
have financial transfers replace also part of the basic AAAC allocation (denoted qAC
0 in
Appendix A.2). The basic AAAC was set so that profit-maximizing trade behavior would make
the costs of the expected abatement induced equal to the expected export revenue. Since the
marginal AAU thus allocated to AC is expected to be exported and hence, would yield an
uncertain net revenue, AC would strictly prefer to have this unit replaced by an additional
financial transfer equal to the expected net export revenue of that unit. If IC obtained AC’s
marginal AAU in exchange for the additional financial transfer to AC, aggregate emissions
and hence, the expected competitive AAU price would remain the same. This is a move to
which IC is indifferent. Thus, due to the difference in risk attitudes and given the precondition
that both Parties should be kept just barely compensated, aggregate emissions could be
reduced even further.
Cost-effective moves of this type may be significant, but their extent depends on the
characteristics of the uncertainty at hand. For the case analyzed here and the parameters used
in the experiment, the cost-effective outcome would be that two-thirds of the expected trade
volume (from AC’s otherwise basic AA) should be replaced by financial transfers (see
Appendix A2).  This means that, instead of being allocated a large AA and exporting a
substantial part of it to IC, AC would be paid a large money transfer for agreeing to a much
smaller AA. The cost-effectiveness of this position implies that, although IC’s AA would be
larger, aggregate AAs and hence, aggregate emissions would now be smaller. This solution
resembles a long-term contract for a large part of AC’s emission abatement and amounts to an
efficient shifting of risks to the party with the lowest costs of risk bearing.
4.2 IC restraints on cost-effective solutions
Financial transfers by IC and, in particular, the implied shift from small to possibly very large
amounts of financial transfers calls for additional considerations. One is that IC may find an
explicit financial transfer less palatable than an equally valued transfer implicit in the ‘in-kind
transfer’ of extra AAUs. This may be so, even though, as we have assumed, payments for
AAUs bought (with seller liability) as well as payments of an agreed financial transfer are
finalized only after the commitment period is over and when AC is found to be in compliance.
Second, since IC in actual fact stands for a group of Annex B countries, an agreement about
the division of compensation payments among these countries may be difficult to negotiate.23
And this may be increasingly difficult if the cost-effective amounts of financial transfers
become large.
4.3. Factors reducing AC’s interest in agreeing to (early) AA commitments
Even though the win/win situation of AC joining IET would seem pretty obvious, non-Annex
B countries are often reported to flatly reject doing so in a near future. There is a number of
possible reasons why this is so. One is, of course, that some governments simply may not be
aware of the potential win/win situation. Another is that they may not believe that such a
favorable outcome could be negotiated or implemented in practice. A third reason may be that
new potential participants in IET believe they could follow an overall more profitable
trajectory, if they initially, i.e., with respect to a first commitment period, refuted all (better-
than-status-quo) offers, expecting that their co-players would offer deals later that would
imply a higher present value of their future trade gains. A final reason, possibly related to
those now mentioned, may be found in a preference of potentially additional IET participants
to avoid going it alone and therefore to wait until there is large enough support for entering
into IET from members of a coalition to which they (want to) belong, e.g., the G 77.
Considerations of the types now mentioned have been disregarded here, where we have
focused on the minimum compensations demanded by potentially additional participants in
IET, based solely on the estimated consequences of IET for a given ‘first’ period. But once
the principles of that starting point have been clarified, the last two reasons just given – (i)
possible benefits to AC from adding pressure on pre-existing trader countries by delaying
their entry into an IET agreement, and (ii) constraints imposed by cooperation with other non-
Annex B countries – should be addressed and may be found to influence the final AC
decisions in real-world negotiations. To repeat, these negotiations concern the middle-ground
between the reservation asks by AC and IC and may not lead to a minimization of ‘income-
compensated’ aggregate emission reductions, but more likely to larger than minimum gains in
terms of GDP to one or both Parties.
Furthermore, in past negotiations, developing countries have expressed a concern that
agreements to sell emission reductions to (governments of) industrial countries, which
provide official development assistance (ODA) to them, may reduce the donors’ willingness
to provide such assistance. This risk remains, of course, in agreements where AC receives a
financial transfer, in particular, if large. Reductions in ODA would be hard to ascertain, since
the baseline for future ODA is counterfactual. Still, this is another important aspect that will
influence AC’s position in real-world negotiations.24
5. Conclusions
We set out from the observation that a cost-effective climate-change policy at given aggregate
costs would mean: (i) that a maximum number of countries should participate in international
emissions trading (IET) in the earliest period where commitment is politically possible; (ii)
that IET should be unconstrained; and (iii) that the composition of the cap on the GHG
emissions of all participating countries should be such that they are given Assigned Amounts
(AAs) which are as small as possible. This would amount to a cost-effective design of a
policy for attaining the resulting cap on the aggregate emissions of these countries.
Here, we have questioned the cost-effectiveness of the generally presumed process for
enlarging the set of participants in IET, which has been to compensate new countries for
joining IET solely in terms of sufficiently large AAs. The basic issue investigated was
whether the minimum compensation for the risk taking of new countries, when participating
in uncertain IET, was less or more costly to the pre-existing trader countries in the Kyoto
Protocol (KP) if compensation took the form of financial transfers instead of extra units of
AAs.
Given that rich countries, which dominate the trader countries listed in Annex B of the KP,
can be assumed to be less risk averse than poor countries, which dominate the group of
potential trader countries, we tested the hypothesis that financial transfers would be the more
cost-effective of the two compensation instruments. This test had a context-explicit
experimental design where graduate students and some Ph.D’s in Economics were informed
at length about the policy background to the experiment. They were invited to regard
themselves as consultants to a developing country and obtain a share of the gains that ‘their’
country could make when participating in IET. Alternatively, the experimental subjects could
simply view themselves as participants in the lottery created by this context. Using the
incentive-compatible Becker-DeGroot-Marschak mechanism with significant monetary
incentives made it possible to elicit risk-averse subjects’ ranking of the reservation asks for
the two instruments.
In first part of the experiment, subjects were exposed to uncertainty in the sense that their
net outcomes in trade gains plus, where relevant, money transfers could take three different,
equally probable values for each minimum compensation level that they could choose. A
large majority of the subjects – 26 out of 30 – behaved as risk averters (two subjects were
excluded due to clearly inconsistent behavior). Fifteen of the 26 subjects differentiated their
asks, stating a lower reservation ask for transfers in money. Among the 11 subjects who
revealed high rates of risk aversion, 10 behaved in this way. The null hypothesis of equal
reservation asks for compensation in money and in additional AA units was rejected with p-
values of less than 1 percent for the data pooled over the two subject groups used.25
In the second part of the test, the subjects were exposed to estimates of the probabilities of
the outcomes in the three states of the world and could withdraw from an agreement at a later
stage when better information became available. Here, somewhat fewer subjects revealed risk
aversion; moreover, their mean asks were lower. Only 7 out of 30 differentiated their asks, but
did so in the direction predicted. Since subjects could choose only among discrete reservation
asks, the data may have underreported the extent of differentiation in this as well as the first
part of the test. Still, in this part of the experiment as well, a significance test rejected the
hypothesis of equal compensation asks with a p-value of less than 1 percent for the pooled
data.
If governments are more risk averse in developing countries than in industrial countries,
and would make decisions in the same way as the risk-averse individuals did in the
experiment, it may be concluded that a monetary transfer is more cost-effective than a transfer
of additional AA units to compensate developing countries for uncertain net gains from
joining a climate treaty that allows IET. We also observed that it is cost-effective to carry the
substitution of money for AA units even further, i.e., by replacing a, perhaps large, share of
that part of the AA which is expected to be exported from the new participating countries. It
was noted that there are factors, partly unrelated to cost-effectiveness, which could reduce (a)
the willingness of pre-existing trader countries to offer ’costless’ compensation to new
countries as well as (b) the interest of potential countries to participate in (even profit-
generating) IET at an early stage. However, most of these factors would exert a similar
influence also on compensations solely in terms of AAs. Thus, the result stands that the use of
financial transfers as a compensation instrument would improve cost-effectiveness when
attracting additional countries to participate in IET.
This result is important also in the sense that substituting money for part of the AAs to new
and poorer countries reduces the risk of so-called ‘hot air’ allocations (allocations larger than
the expected business-as-usual level). Such allocations have raised political demands to place
binding constraints on IET, which would reduce its cost-effectiveness.26
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Appendix B Instructions
(Written instructions distributed in advance.)
Introduction
A. International Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading
The experiment you will participate in investigates the cost-effectiveness of certain options
for international climate change policy. More precisely, the experiment involves a test of four
different mechanisms to increase the number of countries committed to stringent targets for
the emissions of so-called greenhouse gases (GHGs), i.e., gases that restrict heat radiation
from the earth.
Background: The growing concentration of GHGs in the atmosphere implies a risk of
an increase in the average global temperature. Such a climate change, if large, may give
rise to rather drastic consequences such as a higher sea level, changes in the wind and sea
currents, reduced food production and desertification. Some of these changes may directly
or indirectly result in large population movements. All countries may not be affected to the
same extent; some may even gain from an increase in the temperature.
The single most important GHG is carbon dioxide (CO2). CO2 is emitted to the
atmosphere mainly through combustion of fossil fuels. There exists no economically
feasible technique to separate CO2 from other emissions of fossil fuel combustion. Thus, in
order to prevent climate changes the use of fossil fuels would have to be reduced. A
specific feature of GHGs is that their effect on the global climate does not depend on
where the emission source is located.
It has been debated among scientists whether or not there is a man-made risk for global
warming. Here, we just assume that a number of governments have decided to limit the
global GHG emissions.
At the UN conference on environment and development in 1992 in Rio de Janeiro, the so-
called Climate Convention was adopted by more than 180 countries. Its objective is to
stabilize the concentration of GHGs in the atmosphere at such a level and within such a time
frame that the above-mentioned changes will not be drastic and that the ecological systems
can adjust more slowly. In December 1997, a large number of the world’s nations gathered in
Japan to negotiate over country-specific GHG emission targets or quotas for the industrialized
(so-called Annex B) countries – the OECD-countries and the economies in transition – for a
first commitment period of 2008-12. The outcome is known as the Kyoto Protocol, which is37
signed but not yet ratified by a sufficient set of countries. If it is, the signatories would be
assigned the country-specific emission targets (quotas) stated in the Protocol and have the
opportunity to engage in so-called international emissions trading (IET).
IET is expected to ensure a minimum level of cost-effectiveness in the countries’ aggregate
attempts to reduce the emissions of GHGs. In such trading, each high-cost country that has
committed itself to a certain stringent CO2 emissions level (we forget about other GHGs here)
may attain its commitment level at a lower cost by importing emission abatements from
signatory countries with lower abatement costs. So, instead of making all emission abatement
at home, a country can pay others to do part of it. By such transactions exporting countries
transfer parts of their emission quotas to importing countries whereby the total emissions of
all signatory countries remain constant. With a large number of trading countries a single
market price is likely to be established. A country would gain by purchasing emission
reductions as long as its own marginal abatement costs (MACs) exceed the market price.
Similarly, a low-cost country would make trade gains by exporting emission abatements for
which the country's MACs fall short of the market price.
B. More trader countries mean lower GHG emissions at constant costs
The larger the number of participating trader countries, the more low-cost abatement options
will be made available for cost-effective global emission abatements. It is therefore in the
collective interest of the initial set of trader countries, which have agreed that reducing GHG
emissions is better than not reducing them, to invite more countries to commit themselves to
stringent CO2 emissions levels (quotas) and participate in IET. Such new countries would
have to come from the group of developing or middle-income countries. We assume that
participation of such countries would require them to be kept at least fully compensated.
To simplify, we will regard the pre-existing signatory countries, when analytically
practical, as one country only. We assume that this ‘umbrella country’ will have to reduce its
emission quota enough to avoid making any gains from the addition of a new country which
otherwise would be unlikely to accept to join the new climate treaty. This means that the
abatement cost reductions made possible by a new country joining the group of emission
traders would not benefit anyone directly. But it would benefit the global environment by
minimizing emissions for given aggregate commitment costs. Since governments have
expressed that they, other things equal, prefer a lower risk of global warming to a higher, they
would all benefit in this ‘indirect’ fashion.
Excursus on the new country's commitment costs: In the absence of a climate treaty the new
country emits C. If the new country commits itself to an emission quota Q
0, it incurs (unavoidable)
abatement costs equal to the area Q
0DC (see Fig. 1). However, since the treaty allows emissions
trading, the new country can make trade gains by selling emission reductions. On a competitive38
market, the country would maximize its trade gains by selling emission reductions up to the point
where its MAC equals the price level. Given a price p*, profit maximizing sales equal Q
0-Q* units,
which implies sales revenues equal to Q*ABQ
0 and additional abatement costs equal to Q*ADQ
0.
Hence, trade gains equal ABD. Thus, given a choice of Q
0 such that trade gains (ABD) equal
unavoidable abatement costs (Q
0DC), the commitment costs for the new (seller) country –
unavoidable abatement costs minus trade gains or sales revenue minus total abatement costs – will
be zero.
Figure 1 Illustration of a new country’s commitment costs
MAC, P
                MAC
                                            A        B  p*
                                                        D
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Even after the buyer countries have adjusted their commitments so as to keep their commitment
costs constant, the addition of a new trader country would imply a reduction of the market price.
Since pre-existing seller countries then would lose, they would likely demand to be compensated.
To avoid explicitly dealing with this complication of buyers and sellers among the pre-existing
signatory countries having to be treated differently, we regard them, as was mentioned above,
analytically as one ‘umbrella’ country whose emissions target has to be reduced. Thus, the bottom
line would be an outcome where a new (relatively) poor country as well as the umbrella country
would have been fully compensated with respect to the status quo ante.
C. Compensation under uncertainty
If the MACs and the price level for trade in emission quota units were known with certainty,
it would be straightforward to calculate the minimum quota Q
0 that would imply zero
commitment costs for a new trader country, while holding the commitment costs of the39
umbrella country constant. Since we now have to observe that MACs and the price level are
not known with certainty, we assume that the proposed new treaty is such that
(a) Q
0 is set at a level where the expected commitment costs of the new country equal
zero, given a known probability distribution of MACs and price levels (see further
below), and
(b) the expected commitment costs of the umbrella country (= the pre-existing signatory
countries) are held constant. (Commitment costs for the umbrella country = abatement
costs plus expenditure for import of emissions quota units.)
Due to uncertainty about MACs and hence, quota prices, actual commitment costs for a
new (seller) country may be higher or lower than the expected zero. That is, by committing
itself to the climate treaty the new country runs a risk of making losses, something it may
want to be compensated for. In this experiment we will test four different mechanisms to
compensate a poor country for this risk. Given a specific compensation mechanism, the
compensation level is determined in a bargaining process between the pre-existing signatory
countries and the new country.
If a compensation level is agreed upon, the new country commits itself to the specified
emission level, is credited the compensation and engages in IET (then at known marginal
abatement costs).
D. Your role in the experiment
Your role can be viewed as that of a consultant to a poor country that is faced with an option
to commit itself to a certain level of CO2 emissions, Q
0, and participate in IET.  More
specifically, we assume that some time before 2005, your client government – called ‘your
country’ or simply ‘you’ here – will be asked to specify the minimum compensation level at
which it would want to use this option. We assume here that your client accepts your
proposal. If the proposed compensation level were accepted also by the pre-existing signatory
countries – which is found out from a process detailed below – you(r government) would be
able to participate in emissions trading with countries that have higher MACs. If so, your
sales of emission reductions during 2008-12 would be determined by the relevant state of the
world, which will be drawn from a known probability distribution. (The underlying data for
the tests presented here are based on estimates of future emissions levels and MACs of real
countries as found in the literature.)
By participating in this experiment you will be able to earn money. In addition to the show-
up fee of $10, you will be given an initial payment of $20. You may lose this initial payment,
or part of it, if you choose to take certain risks. Or, at the other extreme, you may gain money40
-- (a) an amount according to the accepted level of compensation and (b) trade gains from
exporting emission reductions below Q
0.
Below you find (i) a description of how the negotiations over the compensation level is
mimicked in the experiment and (ii) instructions for the four tests you will participate in.
Please, read these instructions carefully and take time to consider the questions posed there. If
you do, the meeting tomorrow will run smoother and faster.
E. Negotiations concerning the compensation level
In real-world international negotiations it might have paid your country to present the other
side with a compensation requirement that is much higher than its true minimum ask. In the
experiment, however, the transfer is determined in a different fashion. You will be asked to
state your truly smallest compensation amount in a situation, where it does not pay you to
give a distorted response. The reason is that, in this experiment, a value is drawn randomly
from a known distribution where all values between an upper and a lower bound appear with
the same probability; you will get a fixed share of the value drawn if it is equal to or higher
than your ask, otherwise nothing and you will be excluded from participating in emissions
trading.
Basic principle: Compensations will be in money or in quantities of a marketable commodity.
Assume here that you are invited to participate in trading with this commodity, that your true
minimum money compensation was 10 MU (monetary units) and that you stated your ask as
something higher, say 15 MU. This would imply that if a value between 11 MU and 14 MU were
drawn, you would end up foregoing a gain of 1 - 4 MU and be excluded from trading. Had you
stated your true minimum compensation amount, you actually would have avoided that. Hence, it is
not in your interest to state a higher requirement than your true minimum compensation amount.
Assume now that you stated your requirement as 5 MU. This would certainly mean that you would
increase your chances of being qualified for trading. But if a value were drawn between your true
minimum and 5 MU, say 7 MU, you would get 7 MU as your compensation. This is obviously
below what you feel is required to keep you fully compensated. So, it does not pay you to state a
lower requirement than your minimum acceptable requirement. By replacing the amounts in MU
above by quantities in a marketable commodity, the incentive argument will remain the same.
This mechanism (the Becker-deGroot-Marshak mechanism) is known to provide incentives
for truth revelation in a context of the type relevant here. The reason is that the ask you state
can only affect your chance of ‘winning’, but not the amount you win in any positive
direction.  By deviating from your true minimum, you run the risk of not being fully
compensated, or of not benefiting from some of the cases where you would be more than
compensated.41
This is not to say that it will be easy to make up your mind about what your minimum
acceptable compensation is, only that it is not in your interest to respond by consciously
deviating from your best estimate of your minimum acceptable compensation.
Test M: Money compensation
Assume that your country is asked to commit itself to an annual CO2 emissions volume of Q
0
= 1 367 Mtons for the period 2008-12. As indicated above, your country’s cost curve as well
as those of the pre-existing signatory countries are not known with certainty, something that
implies an uncertain market price for emissions trading. Your country’s emissions quota Q
0
has been determined so that your country's expected commitment cost is equal to zero. (If
needed for a proper understanding, check Figure 1 for p* and MAC equal to their expected
values.)
The uncertainty your country faces regarding abatement costs and price is such that there
exists three equally likely states of the world: Low, Medium and High. If you want your
country to be compensated for the risk associated with committing itself to the proposed
climate treaty and therefore require a strictly positive expected value, you can ask for a
minimum financial transfer (M) to your country. Note that the higher your requirement, the
lower the chance that your requirement will be accepted. If your country’s requirement is
accepted, your consultancy fee equals a fixed share of your country’s total gains, defined as
its compensation received plus trade revenue minus abatement costs.
Since the trade itself, given the relevant costs and hence prices, is pretty straightforward,
we take for granted that it is carried out to the point where MACs equal price. Therefore, we
describe in Table M the three possible outcomes directly in terms of your total personal gains
for each compensation level. As you can see, each compensation level is associated with a
unique distribution. The reason is that the more the pre-existing signatory countries pay as
compensation to your country, the less they are required to reduce their emission quotas
which in turn will affect the total gains distribution. Note that Table M shows the end result in
terms of your personal gains (your share of your country’s total gains).
Example: Consider Table M. Assume that the buyout compensation value drawn is $1,168 million.
Then, those who have stated compensation asks lower or equal to this amount receive their share
of this compensation amount and are committed to the initial emission quota Q
0 and qualified to
engage in IET. Assume now that the state of the world drawn is Medium. Then, all those who
qualified for IET receive $19. Had instead Low been drawn, those qualified would have made a
personal loss equal to $11., which would have been subtracted from the initial payment of $20.
Finally, had the state of the world been High, those qualified would have gained $57.42
Tomorrow, you will be asked to state what your country's minimum required financial
transfer (M) is. A compensation level equal to zero is not regarded as an acceptable outcome
here. The shaded row in Table M is only for illustration. Therefore, the buyout compensation
range is $78 million – $1,792 million, where each value has the same probability to be drawn
(1/23.) Then, we will make the draw. We suggest that you consider already now what
minimum compensation amount you would request.
When considering your response you may find it fruitful to proceed as follows. Once you
have arrived at a tentative response, test it by moving ‘one step down’, i.e., check what a
somewhat lower compensation amount would mean for you. If the one-step-further-down
amount seems acceptable, keep that value in mind as your new tentative response, and repeat
the test for another step down until you reach your true minimum compensation level.
Remember that an "unnecessarily" high requirement only adds a risk that you will not receive
any compensation and not qualify for trading. So, it is in your interest to identify and state
your minimum compensation level.
Test X: Extra quota compensation
An alternative mechanism to compensate a country for committing itself to a climate treaty is
to let the country specify its required minimum addition to Q
0, the proposed initial emission
quota. Such an addition, if larger than zero, means that your country would be able to sell
larger volumes of emission reductions. This increment in your country's emissions quota
replaces the money compensation transfer (M) funded by the pre-existing signatory countries
in the preceding test. Thus, here, the additional quota (X) will be transferred from these
countries. Thus, any addition to your country's quota would be at the expense of the pre-
existing trader countries. The larger the X that these countries would have to give to your
country, the less their trade gains would be and – given the requirement that their commitment
costs should remain the same – the less they would be required to reduce their emission
quotas. This means that the larger your X, the lower the price level will be. Thus, just as in the
case of compensation in money, there is a different distribution of your personal gains for
every compensation level, see Table X.
Everything is the same as in the preceding test, except that compensation now works
through your country’s required addition to Q
0 instead of its required money compensation.
1
                                                          
1 When comparing the two mechanisms, note also that payments in both cases are made at the same point in
time: In a real-world case, the country’s money compensation as well as its sales revenue can be assumed to be
kept in escrow until the country is found to be in compliance with the treaty at the end of the commitment
period. In the experiment, your personal gains will be paid in out at the same time for both the M and the X
cases.43
In this new test, compensation in terms of X will be determined by the value drawn from the
range 1-26 Mtons CO2.
Tomorrow, you will be asked what your country’s minimum volume of additional quota
(X) is, given that each amount from 1-26 Mtons CO2 has the same probability to be drawn
(1/26). Again, incentives are provided for you to give a response that reveals your true
minimum compensation required. Once the buyout level has been drawn from the buyout
compensation range, your country will receive an extra quota equal to the level drawn,
provided that your demand did not exceed the buyout compensation level drawn.
We ask you to consider already now what your minimum compensation request would be
in terms of additional quota units, given the information in Table X. Again, consider your
answer as tentative only until you have checked it against a value one step down in the same
fashion as was suggested above.
Test X
prel
The two remaining tests are variations of the two mechanisms we have now dealt with. Both
involve a chance for your country to back out from the agreement at a given point in time
closer to that when trade is about to start. The option to back out at this later stage allows your
country to make its final decision at a date when new and more accurate (= lower variance)
information about costs and prices, i.e., about possible total gains, is likely to be available. For
you as a participant in this test, a withdrawal would be at a cost of $5.
Note that this new test refers to a situation that differs from that of the preceding two tests.
There, uncertainty (concerning 2008-12) was taken to be fully described by three states and
their probabilities. In this new test, the information about the future that is available at the
time of the negotiations (say, 2005) amounts to an estimate only and does not completely
describe the existing uncertainty. Instead, such a description is now taken to exist only at a
later stage (say, late 2007), when your country can make its final decision whether to remain
onboard or not.
The pre-existing signatory countries, which now cannot be sure of the provision of
additional low-cost options for future purchases of emission reductions, will not find contracts
of this new type, which involves compensation in terms of additional quota units, as valuable
as those concerning the preceding one, the X compensation. Therefore, they will not be
willing to offer equally high compensation levels in this new case, X
prel.
Then, another difference between this test and the preceding one is that the upper bound to
the buyout compensation range now will be lower, but how much lower will not be revealed.
Thus, Table X above is relevant also in this new test to the extent that it indicates your
estimated gains at different additional quota levels with the exception for a deleted unknown44
number of rows from the bottom reflecting the now reduced buyout compensation range.
Again, it is your minimum compensation level you are asked to state. You are confronted with
exactly the same type of incentives to respond truthfully as before.
So, the question is “what is the minimum additional quota you need in order to be fully
compensated, given that you will be able to annul the contract at a cost of $5 at a time just
before trading is about to start, given the information about the uncertainty that is available
then”. Test your preliminary response against smaller additional quota values to check what
your true minimum requirement is.
Tomorrow, after you have responded and then after you have received updated information
about the distribution of your personal gains, you will be asked whether you want your
country to keep, or withdraw from, the X
prel contract previously established.
Test M
prel
The final test refers to compensation in terms of a money transfer but with the same
possibility to withdraw as in the preceding test. Table M above is relevant also in this new test
to the extent that it indicates your gains at different compensation levels, except for a deleted
unknown number of levels/rows from the bottom reflecting the reduced buyout compensation
range. As in the preceding test, this range is reduced as a result of the fact that the pre-existing
countries won’t be as keen on offering compensation here as in the M case where you could
not withdraw at a later stage.
The question now is “what is the minimum amount of money, M
prel, you need in order to
be fully compensated, given that you have the option to annul the contract at a cost of $5 at a
later date when you will have new information.”
Test your preliminary response against smaller amounts of compensation in money to
check what your true minimum requirement is.
Tomorrow, after you have responded and then after you have received updated information
about the distribution of your personal gains, you will be asked whether you want your
country to keep, or withdraw from, the M
prel contract previously established.45
REMEMBER …
·  you are assumed to be a consultant to a poor country that wants to be compensated for
participating in international emissions trading with uncertain benefits
·  you are asked to state the minimum level of compensation for four different compensation
mechanisms
·  you have no incentives to deviate from your true estimate of the minimum compensation
required (check the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak mechanism)
·  your incentives are formed by the fact that you get a share of your country’s compensation
and its efficient emissions trade
·  your country is accepted as a trader and you receive your payoffs, contingent upon the
state of the world, if your stated minimum compensation requirement at most equals the
acceptable compensation drawn from the uniform probability distribution over the values
given in the first column of the relevant tables
·  your payoffs are determined by a random draw of one of three states of the world
DON’T FORGET TO OPEN THE ATTACHED TABLES!Table M.  Your payoffs at different M compensation levels Table X.  Your payoffs at different X compensation levels
in the three states of the world, $ in the three states of the world, $
Your payoffs in states of
the world
Your payoffs’ Your payoffs in states of the
world
























0 36 -2 -33 0 804 0 36 -2 -33 0 804
78 37 -1 -32 2 803 1 38 -1 -32 2 811
156 39 1 -30 3 803 2 39 1 -31 3 818
234 40 2 -29 4 802 3 41 2 -29 4 824
312 42 3 -28 6 801 4 42 3 -28 6 831
389 43 5 -26 7 800 5 44 5 -27 7 838
467 45 6 -25 9 799 6 46 6 -26 9 845
545 46 8 -23 10 799 7 47 8 -24 10 852
623 47 9 -22 12 798 8 49 9 -23 12 859
701 49 11 -20 13 797 9 50 11 -22 13 866
779 50 12 -19 15 796 10 52 12 -20 15 872
857 52 14 -17 16 795 11 54 14 -19 16 879
935 53 15 -16 17 795 12 55 15 -18 17 886
1013 55 17 -14 19 794 13 57 17 -16 19 893
1091 56 18 -13 20 793 14 58 18 -15 20 900
1168 57 19 -11 22 792 15 60 19 -14 22 908
1246 59 21 -10 23 791 16 61 21 -12 23 915
1324 60 22 -8 25 790 17 63 22 -11 25 922
1402 62 24 -7 26 790 18 65 24 -10 26 929
1480 63 25 -5 28 789 19 66 25 -9 28 936
1558 65 27 -4 29 788 20 68 27 -7 29 943
1636 66 28 -3 31 787 21 69 28 -6 31 951
1714 67 30 -1 32 786 22 71 30 -5 32 958
1792 69 31 0 33 786 23 73 31 -3 33 965
24 74 32 -2 35 973
25 76 34 -1 36 980
26 77 35 0 38 987
(The table contains errors in rounding off.) (The table contains errors in rounding off.)UPDATED INFORMATION (previous estimates in parenthesis)
Table M
prel.  Your payoffs at different M compensation levels Table X
prel.  Your payoffs at different X compensation levels
in the three states of the world, $ in the three states of the world, $
Your payoffs in states of
the world
Your payoffs’ Your payoffs in states of the
world
























0 36 -2 -33 (0) -11 (804) 458 0 36 -2 -33 (0) -11 (804) 458
78 37 -1 -32 (2) -10 (803) 458 1 38 -1 -32 (2) -10 (811) 462
156 39 1 -30 (3) -8 (803) 457 2 39 1 -31 (3) -8 (818) 466
234 40 2 -29 (4) -7 (802) 457 3 41 2 -29 (4) -7 (824) 470
312 42 3 -28 (6) -5 (801) 456 4 42 3 -28 (6) -5 (831) 474
389 43 5 -26 (7) -4 (800) 456 5 44 5 -27 (7) -4 (838) 478
467 45 6 -25 (9) -2 (799) 455 6 46 6 -26 (9) -2 (845) 482
545 46 8 -23 (10) -1 (799) 455 7 47 8 -24 (10) -1 (852) 486
623 47 9 -22 (12) 0 (798) 454 8 49 9 -23 (12) 0 (859) 490
701 49 11 -20 (13) 2 (797) 454 9 50 11 -22 (13) 2 (866) 495
779 50 12 -19 (15) 3 (796) 454 10 52 12 -20 (15) 3 (872) 499
857 52 14 -17 (16) 5 (795) 453 11 54 14 -19 (16) 5 (879) 503
935 53 15 -16 (17) 6 (795) 453 12 55 15 -18 (17) 6 (886) 507
1013 55 17 -14 (19) 8 (794) 452 13 57 17 -16 (19) 8 (893) 511
1091 56 18 -13 (20) 9 (793) 452 14 58 18 -15 (20) 9 (900) 515
1168 57 19 -11 (22) 10 (792) 451 15 60 19 -14 (22) 10 (908) 520
1246 59 21 -10 (23) 12 (791) 451 16 61 21 -12 (23) 12 (915) 524
1324 60 22 -8 (25) 13 (790) 450 17 63 22 -11 (25) 13 (922) 528
1402 62 24 -7 (26) 15 (790) 450 18 65 24 -10 (26) 15 (929) 532
1480 63 25 -5 (28) 16 (789) 449 19 66 25 -9 (28) 16 (936) 536
1558 65 27 -4 (29) 18 (788) 449 20 68 27 -7 (29) 18 (943) 541
1636 66 28 -3 (31) 19 (787) 448 21 69 28 -6 (31) 19 (951) 545
1714 67 30 -1 (32) 21 (786) 448 22 71 30 -5 (32) 21 (958) 549
1792 69 31 0 (33) 22 (786) 447 23 73 31 -3 (33) 22 (965) 554
24 74 32 -2 (35) 23 (973) 558
25 76 34 -1 (36) 24 (980) 562
26 77 35 0 (38) 26 (987) 567
(The table contains errors in rounding off.)  (The table contains errors in rounding off.)